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1 Introduction
The early literature on mixed oligopolies considered games with a predeter-
mined order of moves and investigated market regulation possibilities through
a public firm, especially, in order to increase social welfare. For instance,
Cremer et al (1989) analyze the regulation of a simultaneous-move quantity-
setting oligopoly market for which they report that the market outcome is
equivalent to the solution, in which the central authority maximizes total
surplus subject to the constraints that the public firms must break even.
Fraja and Delbono (1989) show for a mixed quantity-setting homogeneous
good oligopoly that public leadership leads to higher social welfare than the
simultaneous-move mixed or standard oligopolies.2 However, comparing the
simultaneous-move case with or without a public firm leads to an ambivalent
result: It can happen that if there are sufficiently many identical firms on the
market, then the public firm is better advised to maximize its profits in order
to increase social welfare. Remaining in the quantity-setting framework, Cor-
neo and Jeanne (1994) derive conditions under which the presence of a public
firm can be beneficial.3
In a seminal paper Pal (1998) investigates for mixed oligopolies the en-
dogenous emergence of certain orders of moves.4 Assuming linear demand and
constant marginal costs, he shows for a quantity-setting oligopoly with one
public firm that the simultaneous-move case does not emerge, the public firm
as a first mover emerges just in the two-period duopolistic case, while the pri-
vate firms moving simultaneously in the first period followed by the public firm
in the second period always constitutes a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of the timing game. His main observations are that incorporating a public firm
substantially changes the outcome of the timing game and that the presence of
a public firm increases social welfare.5 Matsumura (2003) relaxes the assump-
tions of linear demand and identical marginal costs employed by Pal (1998).
The case of increasing marginal costs in Pal’s (1998) framework has recently
been investigated by Tomaru and Kiyono (2010).6
There is less literature on price-setting mixed oligopolies. Ogawa and Kato
(2006) consider mixed duopolies in the framework of a homogeneous good
2 We will frequently refer to oligopolies without public firms as standard or purely private
oligopolies.
3 For other notable contributions in these directions, see for instance, Harris and Wiens
(1980), Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) and Anderson et al (1997).
4 The timing question in purely private oligopolies has been investigated earlier by Gal-
Or (1985), Dowrick (1986), Boyer and Moreaux (1987), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992), among others.
5 Jacques (2004) noted that in the duopolistic case with more than two periods the public
firm producing in the first period and the private firm producing in the last period is also
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In addition, Lu (2007) shows for the duopolistic case
there are even more subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in which the private firm can produce
in any period with the exception of the last one and the public firm has to produce in a
subsequent period.
6 For further extensions we refer to Anam et al (2007) and Lu and Poddar (2009), among
others.
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price-setting game. They investigate a symmetric Bertrand duopolistic set-
ting in which the firms have to serve the entire demands they face. Assuming
linear demand and identical quadratic cost functions, they find for the two
sequential-move games that the presence of a public firm may be either harm-
ful or beneficial, while for the simultaneous-move game the outcome remains
the same as shown by Dastidar (1995) for the purely private case. Dastidar
and Sinha (2011) extend these results to strictly convex cost functions and
decreasing demand functions. In another recent work Roy Chowdhury (2009)
considers a price-setting mixed Bertrand duopoly (that is, firms have to serve
the demands they face) and a mixed semi-Bertrand duopoly (in which only the
public firm has to meet all demand). However, he focuses on the simultaneous-
move case, and thus, does not solve the timing problem. For a heterogeneous
goods price-setting mixed duopoly timing game Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007) obtained
the endogenous emergence of simultaneous moves.
In this paper we investigate a homogeneous good mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth
duopoly with capacity constraints. In contrast to the literature on endogenous
timing in purely private firm oligopolies as well as mixed oligopolies we find
that the order of moves does not matter (Corollary 1). In addition, social wel-
fare is higher in the mixed version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game than in
its standard version with only private firms (Corollary 2). As a byproduct we
obtain that the mixed version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game has
an equilibrium in pure strategies for any capacity levels (Corollary 3).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
our framework and introduce the necessary notations. In Section 3 we recall
the results of Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) on the capacity-constrained
Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with purely private firms, which we will
need in comparing the results of the mixed version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth
game with its standard version. Section 4 determines the equilibria of three
games with exogenously given orderings of moves. Section 5 gathers the main
consequences of our analysis carried out in Section 4. Section 6 illustrates our
results in case of linear demand. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
2 The framework
The demand is given by function D on which we impose the following restric-
tions:
Assumption 1 The demand function D intersects the horizontal axis at
quantity a and the vertical axis at price b. D is strictly decreasing, concave
and twice continuously differentiable on (0, a); moreover, D is right-continuous
at 0, left-continuous at b and D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ b.
Clearly, any price-setting firm will not set its price above b. Let us denote by P
the inverse demand function. Thus, P (q) = D−1 (q) for 0 < q ≤ a, P (0) = b,
and P (q) = 0 for q > a.
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On the producers’ side we have a public firm and a private firm, that is,
we consider a so-called mixed duopoly. We label the public firm with 1 and
the private firm with 2. Our assumptions imposed on the firms’ cost functions
are as follows:
Assumption 2 The two firms have zero unit costs up to their respective
positive capacity constraints k1 and k2.
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We shall denote by pc the market clearing price and by pM the price set by
a monopolist without capacity constraints, i.e. pc = P (k1 + k2) and p
M =
arg maxp∈[0,b] pD (p). In what follows p1, p2 ∈ [0, b] stand for the prices set by
the firms.
For all i ∈ {1, 2} we shall denote by pmi the unique revenue maximizing
price on the firms’ residual demand curves Dri (p) = (D(p)− kj)+, where j ∈
{1, 2} and j 6= i, i.e. pmi = arg maxp∈[0,b] pDri (p). The inverse residual demand
curves will be denoted by R1 and R2. Clearly, p
c and pmi are well defined
whenever Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
Let us denote by pdi the price for which p
d
i min{ki, D
(
pdi
)} = pmi Dri (pmi ),
whenever this equation has a solution.8 Provided that the private firm has ‘suf-
ficient’ capacity (i.e. pc < pm2 ), then if it is a profit-maximizer, it is indifferent
to whether serving residual demand at price level pmi or selling min{ki, D
(
pdi
)}
at the lower price level pdi .
Concerning the employed rationing rule, we impose the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 3 We assume efficient rationing on the market.
Thus, the firms’ demands equal
∆i (D, p1, q1, p2, q2) =

D (pi) if pi < pj
Ti(p, q1, q2) if p = pi = pj
(D (pi)− qj)+ if pi > pj
for all i ∈ {1, 2}, where Ti stands for a tie-breaking rule.9 We will consider
two sequential-move games (one with the public firm as the first mover and
one with the private firm as the first-mover) and a simultaneous-move game.
An appropriate tie-breaking rule will be specified for each of the three cases.
We assume that the firms play the production-to-order type Bertrand-
Edgeworth game, and therefore, the game reduces to a price-setting game
since the firms can adjust their productions to the demands they face. Now
7 The real assumption here is that firms have identical unit costs since in case of
production-to-order, as will be assumed later, this is just a matter of normalization.
8 The equation defining pdi has a solution if, for instance, p
m
i ≥ pc, which will be the case
in our analysis when we will refer to pdi .
9 The selection of the appropriate tie-breaking rule will ensure the existence of a Nash
equilibrium or subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in order to avoid the consideration of
ε-equilibria implying a more difficult analysis without substantial gain.
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we are ready to specify the firms objective functions. The public firm aims to
maximize total surplus, that is,
pi1(p1, p2) =
∫ min{(D(pj)−ki)+,kj}
0
Rj(q)dq +
∫ min{a,ki}
0
P (q)dq, (1)
where 0 ≤ pi ≤ pj ≤ b. Figure 1 illustrates the social welfare, where the
area indicated by black dashed lines corresponds to the second integral, while
the area indicated by grey dashed lines corresponds to the first integral in
expression (1). It should be mentioned that the first integral is not directly
Fig. 1 Social welfare
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drawn based on Rj , but by a rightward shift of the vertical axis by ki units,
which enables us to illustrate the social welfare in one figure. It can be easily
seen that in determining social welfare the low price does not play a role unless
both prices are too high.
The private firm is a profit-maximizer, and therefore,
pi2(p1, p2) = p2 min {k2, ∆2 (D, p1, k1, p2, k2)} . (2)
3 The benchmark
We will compare our price-setting mixed-oligopoly games with the price-setting
games with purely private firms, that is, both firms’ profit functions take the
form of the expression given by (2). The purely private case has been investi-
gated by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from which we recall the interesting
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case in which the simultaneous-move game does not have an equilibrium in
pure strategies, i.e., pm2 > p
c in case of k2 ≥ k1.10 We shall emphasize that De-
neckere and Kovenock (1992) assume for the sequential-move games that the
demand is allocated first to the second mover11 and for the simultaneous-move
case that the demand is allocated in proportion of the firms’ capacities.12
Proposition 1 (Deneckere and Kovenock,1992) Under k2 ≥ k1, pm2 > pc
and Assumptions 1-3, the results below are known about the equilibrium of the
three games.
1. The simultaneous-move game only has an equilibrium in mixed strategies
with common support [pd2, p
m
2 ] and equilibrium profits are equal to pi
S
1 =
pd2k1 and pi
S
2 = p
m
2 D
r
2(p
m
2 ) = p
d
2 min{k2, D
(
pd2
)}.13
2. If firm 2 moves first and firm 1 second, then in a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium the equilibrium prices are given by p2 = p1 = p
m
2 and the respective
equilibrium profits equal piL2 = p
m
2 D
r
2(p
m
2 ) and pi
F
1 = p
m
2 k1. In addition,
if k1 = k2, then we also have a second subgame-perfect equilibrium with
equilibrium prices given by p2 = p
d
2 and p1 = p
m
2 .
3. If firm 1 moves first and firm 2 second, then in a subgame-perfect equi-
librium the equilibrium prices are given by p1 = p
d
2 and p2 = p
m
2 and the
respective equilibrium profits equal piL1 = p
d
2k1 and pi
F
2 = p
m
2 D
r
2(p
m
2 ). In ad-
dition, if k1 = k2, then we also have a second subgame-perfect equilibrium
with equilibrium prices given by p1 = p
m
2 and p2 = p
m
2 .
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) find that firm 2 moving first and firm 1 moving
second constitutes an equilibrium of the timing game, which can be verified
by looking at the payoff table of a two-period timing game shown in Table 1,
where in case of k2 > k1 we have pi
F
1 > pi
S
1 = pi
L
1 and pi
L
2 = pi
S
2 = pi
F
2 .
Table 1 Payoffs for the two period timing game.
First period Second period
First period (piS1 , pi
S
2 ) (pi
L
1 , pi
F
2 )
Second period (piF1 , pi
L
2 ) (pi
S
1 , pi
S
2 )
In addition, by introducing more time periods and discounting, Deneckere
and Kovenock (1992) achieve that this ordering of moves is the one and only
emerging endogenously.
10 For other cases the game reduces to the standard Cournot and Bertrand games.
11 This distinction ensures that the second mover does not need to slightly undercut the
first mover.
12 It should be emphasized that the obtained results remain valid for a large class of other
tie-breaking rules employed in the simultaneous-move game.
13 The results gathered in case 1 summarize the results obtained by Levitan and Shubik
(1972), Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986).
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4 Exogenously given order of moves
In our analysis we will discuss the above mentioned three games with exoge-
nously given ordering of moves for the mixed duopoly version of the Bertrand-
Edgeworth game. We are restricting ourselves again to the interesting case in
which the simultaneous-move purely private version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth
game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e. max{pm1 , pm2 } > pc.14
Note that as there are two different types of firms (as far as their payoffs are
concerned), it is not the same whether the private or the public firm has the
higher capacity. In particular, we have to distinguish between the following
two cases: (i) pm2 > p
c and (ii) pm1 > p
c ≥ pm2 . We will also refer to the first
case as the strong private firm case and to the second case as the weak private
firm case. Therefore, we would have to analyze both cases separately for all
the three orderings of moves.
4.1 The strong private firm case
Firstly, let us make clear that the price pd2 having been defined earlier always
exists since pm2 > p
c. Therefore, we make no mistake if we use this price in our
results in this section.
Now we collect some basic results in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1-3 and pm2 > p
c, it is in none of the timing
games with an exogenously given order of moves optimal for the private firm
to declare p2 < p
d
2.
Proof We get the result directly from the definition of pd2. By setting p2 = p
m
2 ,
even if the private firm serves only residual demand, its profit will be higher
than at a price p2 less than p
d
2. uunionsq
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1-3 and pm2 > p
c, the social welfare in an
equilibrium cannot be larger than the social welfare associated with the case in
which both firms set price pd2.
Proof The definition of the public firm’s profit implies that if a firm serves
residual demand, then the lower price it sets the higher the social welfare.
On the other hand, if a company is the low-price firm, and it produces at
its capacity limit, then changing its price, as long as it remains a capacity
constrained low-price firm, does not alter social welfare. The private firm will
not set its price below pd2 by Lemma 1, while the public firm cannot increase
social welfare by setting a price below pd2. Hence, comparing all cases satisfying
min{p1, p2} ≥ pd2, social welfare is maximized when both firms set price pd2.
uunionsq
14 Otherwise, the ordinary price-setting game results in a market-clearing or a competitive
outcome, which also remains the outcome of the mixed duopoly game. For more details we
refer to the concluding remarks in Section 7.
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Lemmas 1 and 2 show that deleting strictly dominated strategies from the
private firms strategy set excludes prices below pd2 and after that p
d
2 turns out
to be a weakly dominant strategy of the public firm.
Now that we are aware of these results, we begin to discuss the three games
with an exogenously given ordering of moves. We will start with specifying the
tie-breaking rules for these games. The most common assumption if two firms
set the same price, is that they share the consumers in proportion to their
capacities (i.e. firms i’s sales equal min {ki, D(p)ki/(k1 + k2)}. Clearly, any of
the two firms has the right to let its competitor serve a certain portion of its
consumers. Such an act would seem to be irrational at first sight, but we will
see below that if it is carried out by the public firm, it can drive the market
to a socially better equilibrium. A more complete specification of the game
would allow the public firm to select the consumers freely, strategically leaving
them to the private firm. However, we fix a tie-breaking rule, which turns out
to be compatible with the public firms incentives, and after determining the
equilibria of the three games it can be easily verified that the public firm could
not have selected a better tie-breaking rule.
Assumption 4 We specify the tie-breaking rules for the three games in the
following way:
– In the simultaneous-move game we assume that if p1 = p2 ≤ pd2, then
the demand is allocated first to the private firm (in other words: the public
firm allows the private to serve the entire demand up to its previously given
capacity k2). Otherwise the two firms share the consumers proportionally,
i.e. firm i’s sales equal min {ki, D(p)ki/(k1 + k2)}.
– When the public firm is the first mover, we assume that the entire demand
is allocated first to the private firm (i.e. to the second mover) at any price
level in case of price ties.
– Provided that the private firm moves first, if p1 = p2 ≤ pd2, then the
demand is allocated first to the private firm; otherwise the entire demand
is allocated first to the public firm (i.e. to the second mover).
One can observe that for prices higher than pd2 we employ the same tie-breaking
rule as Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) in establishing Proposition 1. For the
simultaneous-move game we could have selected many other tie-breaking rules
for prices not equal to pd2. The main requirement for prices above p
d
2 is that
none of the firms has a priority to serve consumers up to its capacity constraint
in case of price ties. Turning to the game with a public leader, it is easy to see
that in case of other tie-breaking rules the subgames do not have a solution
since the private firm just wants to undercut the public firm’s price for prices
above pd2. Hence, allocating demand first to the second mover restores the
solvability of the game without changing the nature of the game. Finally, for
the game with a private leader we should remark that the public firm has many
optimal replies since matching or undercutting the private firm’s price does not
change social welfare. However, if the public firm wants to punish the private
firm for setting high prices, then it should commit itself to undercutting the
private firm’s price. This commitment is credible since for prices higher than
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pd2 the public firm has no incentive to deviate from undercutting the private
firm’s price in the second period, which explains why our tie-breaking rule
gives priority to the public firm.
Now we will give all the equilibria of the different cases in separate propo-
sitions. We start with the simultaneous-move case.
Proposition 2 (Simultaneous moves) Assume that pm2 > p
c and Assump-
tions 1-4 hold. Then the simultaneous-move game has the following two types
of Nash-equilibria in pure strategies:
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
d
2 (NE1) and p
∗
1 ≤ pd2, p∗2 = pm2 (NE2),
where the continuum of NE2 equilibria are payoff equivalent. Moreover, if
k1 ≤ k2 and k1 ≤ D(pM ), then the simultaneous-move game has in addition
the following set of Nash-equilibria
p∗1 > max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
, p∗2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
(NE3).
Finally, no other equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Proof In obtaining a better understanding of the simultaneous-move game, the
best response correspondences B1 and B2 of the two firms will be helpful. In
deriving B1, observe that the tie-breaking rule can be neglected since in case
of equal prices social welfare does not depend on the allocation of consumers
to the firms. We will consider three case. First, if the private firm sets price
p2 such that none of the two firms can solely serve the entire demand, then
the public firm maximizes social welfare by not setting a higher price than
the private firm. We have multiple best responses since decreasing the public
firm’s price within [0, p2) results in converting its income to consumer surplus.
However, the sum (i.e. the payoff of the public firm) remains the same. Raising
its price above p2 would mean that the public firm faces residual demand and
achieves a lower level of social welfare than when it sets p1 = p2. Second, if
the private firm sets price p2 such that it can serve at least the entire demand,
while the public firm can serve at most the entire demand, then the public firm
loses its influence on social welfare and can set its price arbitrarily. Third, if
the private firm sets a sufficiently high price such that the public firm assures
the best social outcome by offering its whole capacity at price P (k1), then any
price p1 ≤ P (k1) maximizes social welfare. Summerizing our findings,
B1(p2) =
 [0, p2] if p2 < min{P (k1), P (k2)},[0, b] if P (k2) ≤ p2 ≤ P (k1),
[0, P (k1)] if P (k1) < p2 or p2 = P (k1) < P (k2).
(3)
Turning to B2, if the public firm sets a price below p
d
2, then the private firm
reacts with pm2 . If the public firm sets price p
d
2, then the private firm has two
optimal replies: pd2 and p
m
2 because of Assumption 4. If p1 > p
d
2, then the
private firm will undercut the public firm’s price and an optimal reply does
not exist as long as it has to share the demand with the public firm at price
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p1. Finally, the public firm’s price can be large enough to be not followed by
the private firm. In particular, if p1 is larger than P (k2) and larger than p
M ,
then the private firm will either set a price to sell its entire capacity or the
monopolist’s price. Thus, we have obtained
B2(p1) =

{pm2 } if p1 < pd2,
{pd2, pm2 } if p1 = pd2,
∅ if pd2 < p1 ≤ max{P (k2), pM},
{max{P (k2), pM}} if max{P (k2), pM} < p1.
(4)
Now one can verify directly or by relying on the best response correspon-
dences that NE1, NE2 and NE3 are equilibrium profiles.
15
It remains to be shown that no other equilibrium exists. Take an equilib-
rium profile (p∗1, p
∗
2). By Lemma 1 p
∗
2 ≥ pd2. Let p = P (k1). Since the public
firm can ensure at least pi1(p, p) social welfare at price p, even if the private
firm sets a higher price, we must have p∗1 ≤ p, which in turn implies that
p∗2 ≤ p since Dr2(p2) = 0 for all p2 > p. We cannot have an equilibrium with
pd2 < p
∗
1 = p
∗
2 ≤ p since otherwise the private firm would gain from slightly
undercutting the public firm’s price.
Assume that the equilibrium satisfies p∗1 < p
∗
2 ≤ p. Clearly, if pd2 < p∗1 < p,
then the private firm would benefit from undercutting price p∗1; a contradiction.
If p∗1 = p
d
2, then we must have either p
∗
2 = p
d
2 or p
∗
2 = p
m
2 ; and thus, we arrived
to either an NE1 or NE2 type profile. If p
∗
1 < p
d
2, then we must have p
∗
2 = p
m
2 ,
which is an NE2 type equilibrium profile.
Assume that the equilibrium satisfies p∗2 < p
∗
1 ≤ p. Suppose that k1 >
k2. Then p < P (k2), and therefore, the public firm faces a positive residual
demand, which means that it can increase social welfare by reducing its price;
a contradiction. Assume that k1 ≤ k2. If Dr1(p∗1) > 0, then we cannot have
an equilibrium since once again the public firm would benefit from decreasing
its price. If Dr1(p
∗
1) = 0, then the public firm cannot gain from altering its
price. However, the private firm could benefit from increasing its price by the
concavity of D if p∗2 < p
M . For the same reason the private firm would gain
from decreasing its price if p∗2 > p
M subject to p∗2 ≥ P (k2). Hence, we just can
have an equilibrium if p∗2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
and we arrived at an NE3 type
profile. uunionsq
We have to remark that NE3 is a very implausible equilibrium since it requires
that the public firm admits very high prices in the market and practically does
not want to enter the market. While in case of NE3 the public firm cannot
increase social welfare it still can increase consumer surplus and its own income
by setting a price below pM , which could be a natural secondary goal for the
public firm if it has to select between prices resulting in the same social welfare.
We continue with the case of public leadership.
Proposition 3 (Public firm moves first) Assume that pm2 > p
c and As-
sumptions 1-4 hold. Then the sequential-move game with the public firm as a
15 In carrying out the verification, pd2 < P (k2) and p
d
2 < p
m
2 < P (k1) will be helpful.
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first mover has the following unique subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium in pure
strategies:
p∗1 = p
d
2, p
∗
2(p1) =

pm2 if p1 < p
d
2,
pd2 if p1 = p
d
2,
p1 if p
d
2 < p1 ≤ max{P (k2), pM},
max{P (k2), pM} if max{P (k2), pM} < p1.
(SPNE1)
Proof First, we determine the reaction function p∗2(·) of the private firm. Ob-
serve that the private firm’s best response correspondence can be obtained
by altering its best response correspondence (4) derived for the simultaneous-
move game in case of pd2 < p1 ≤ max{P (k2), pM} for which in the public
leadership game the private firm matches the public firm’s price p1.
The first period action of the public firm depends on the decision of the
private firm when the public firm sets price pd2. In other words the private
firm’s reaction function is either the one given by SPNE1 or
p∗2(p1) =
p
m
2 if p1 ≤ pd2;
p1 if p
d
2 < p1 ≤ max{P (k2), pM},
max{P (k2), pM} if max{P (k2), pM} < p1.
(5)
Concerning the reaction function given by SPNE1, the public firm maximizes
social welfare in the first period by choosing price p∗1 = p
d
2, and thus, SPNE1
is indeed a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Turning to the second reaction function given by (5), a first period social
welfare maximizing price does not exist if the private firm reacts in the way
given by (5) since the public firm wants to set its price as close as possible to pd2,
but above pd2. Hence, (5) does not yield a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
uunionsq
Finally, we consider the case of private leadership.
Proposition 4 (Private firm moves first) Assume that pm2 > p
c and As-
sumptions 1-4 hold. Then the sequential-move game with the private firm as a
first mover has the following two types of subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria:
p∗2 = p
d
2, p
∗
1(p2) =
p2 if p2 ≤ p
d
2,
p1 ∈ [0, p2] if pd2 < p2 ≤ P (k1),
p1 ∈ [0, P (k1)] if p2 > P (k1);
(SPNE1)
and
p∗2 = p
m
2 , p
∗
1(p2) =
{
p1 ∈ [0, p2] if p2 ≤ P (k1),
p1 ∈ [0, P (k1)] if p2 > P (k1); (SPNE2)
where the continuum of SPNE1 as well as the continuum SPNE2 equilibria
are payoff equivalent, respectively. Moreover, if k1 ≤ k2 and k1 ≤ D(pM ), then
12 Tama´s La´szlo´ Balogh, Attila Tasna´di
the sequential-move game has in addition the following set of subgame perfect
Nash-equilibria
p∗2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
,
p∗1(p2) =

p1 ∈ [0, p2] if p2 < P (k2),
p1 ∈ [0, b] if P (k2) ≤ p2 < pM ,
p1 ∈
(
max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
, b
]
if p2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
,
p1 ∈ [0, b] if max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
< p2 ≤ P (k1),
p1 ∈ [0, P (k1)] if P (k1) < p2;
(SPNE3)
where the continuum of SPNE3 equilibria are payoff equivalent. Finally, no
other equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Proof We solve the game by backward induction. Observe that the best re-
sponse correspondence of the public firm is given by (3) since it remains the
same as in case of simultaneous moves. In addition, if the private firm sets a
price not higher than pd2, then the public firm should not set a price below the
private firm’s price since anticipating this behavior the private firm would set
definitely price pm2 in period 1.
However, if the price set by the private firm is high enough so that it
can serve the entire market, then the public firm loses its influence on social
welfare. It might be beneficial for the private firm to set an extremely high
price if its capacity is larger than the public firm’s capacity and the public
firm cannot do better by matching or undercutting the private firm’s price.
Observe that in this latter case only the reaction of the public firm at price
max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
matters.
Taking this into account, we can obtain SPNE1, SPNE2 and SPNE3 as
possible types of subgame-perfect equilibria. uunionsq
We have to remark that SPNE3 is an implausible equilibrium since it requires,
for the same reasons as explained after the proof of Proposition 2, that the
private firm anticipates a very strange reaction of the public firm. Hence, in
all three games only type 1 or type 2 equilibria are plausible. But what will
decide which of these two equilibria is to be played? We now collect arguments
in favor of (SP )NE1. Firstly, (SP )NE1 is the only Pareto-optimal equilibrium
among all the subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria. Secondly, an outcome being
very close to (SP )NE1 can be compelled by the public firm. Namely, assume
that the public company sets p1 = p
d
2 +  in any of the three cases. Then if the
private firm sets its price slightly below this level, it will be strictly better off
than in case of (SP )NE1 or (SP )NE2. Although the social welfare will be a
bit lower than in case of (SP )NE1, but far higher than in case of (SP )NE2.
Therefore, this act is worth for the public firm to avoid the risk of an (SP )NE2
type outcome.
To sum up, we argued that p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
d
2 is the most plausible outcome
that is expected to be played.
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4.2 The weak private firm case
Our second case to be analyzed occurs when pm1 > p
c ≥ pm2 . We begin the
analysis with the following lemma which dictates that the private firm is not
intended to set any price below the market clearing price.
Lemma 3 Under Assumptions 1-3 and pm1 > p
c ≥ pm2 the private firm’s
strategies p2 < p
c are strictly dominated in all three possible orderings.
Proof The private firm can only be worse off by selling all its capacity at a
lower price than the market clearing price due to the definition of pc and the
fact that pm2 ≤ pc. uunionsq
Before solving the game, we have to define how the firms share the market
in case of price ties. In particular, we employ the same tie-breaking rule as
Deneckere and Kovenock (1992).
Assumption 5 If the two firms set the same price, then we assume for the
sequential-move games that the demand is allocated first to the second mover
and for the simultaneous-move game that the demand is allocated in propor-
tion of the firms’ capacities.
In contrast to the previous section, there is only one (subgame-perfect)
Nash-equilibrium in the weak private firm case resulting in a market-clearing
outcome. This is pointed out in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If pm1 > p
c ≥ pm2 and Assumptions 1-3, 5 are satisfied, then
each price-setting game with an exogenously given ordering of moves has the
following (subgame-perfect) Nash-equilibria in pure strategies with the follow-
ing equilibrium prices:
p∗1 ∈ [0, pc], p∗2 = pc (SPNE4)
Moreover, there is no other equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof Now we do not consider the different orderings separately, like we did in
the previous subsection. It is easy to see that any equilibrium of type SPNE4
specifies (subgame-perfect) Nash-equilibrium prices in all the three possible
orderings.
We briefly show that there are no other equilibrium price profiles left.
Since by pm1 > p
m
2 we have k1 > k2, which in turn implies P (k1) < P (k2)
none of the firms will set a price above P (k1). Moreover, we cannot have an
equilibrium with P (k1) ≥ p∗2 > p∗1 and p∗2 > pc since this would imply that the
private firm has to serve residual demand, which would result in less profits
for the private firm than setting pc by the concavity of the residual demand
function and by pm2 < p
c. In addition, there cannot be an equilibrium with
pc < p∗2 < p
∗
1 ≤ P (k1) neither because then the public firm could increase
social welfare by unilaterally decreasing its price. These arguments are valid
for any ordering of moves.
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It remains to be shown that we cannot have pc < p∗1 = p
∗
2 ≤ P (k1) in
an equilibrium, which we will check separately for the different orderings of
moves. Concerning the simultaneous-move case, the private firm would have
an incentive to undercut the public firm’s price. Turning to private leadership,
the private firm has to serve residual demand by Assumption 5, and therefore,
it would prefer price pc to p∗2 by the concavity of the residual demand func-
tion and by pm2 < p
c. Finally, considering public leadership, the private firm
matches the public firm’s price in region [pc, P (k1)], and thus, the public firm
maximizes social welfare by setting its price not larger than pc. uunionsq
5 Implications
In this section we collect the corollaries of our analysis carried out in the
previous section. Our first corollary determines the endogenous order of moves
based on a two-period timing game in which both firms can select between two
periods for setting their prices. If one accepts our arguments brought forward
in favor of a type 1 equilibrium (that is, an NE1 or an SPNE1) in case of a
strong private firm, then by checking Propositions 2-4 one immediately sees
that the three type 1 equilibria result in the same equilibrium price pd2 and
the same equilibrium payoffs. The case of a weak private firm is even simpler
by Proposition 5.
Corollary 1 Assuming that a type 1 equilibrium is played in the case of a
strong private firm, the ordering of price decisions does not matter.
Now we turn to the question whether replacing a public firm by a private
firm (privatization) has a social welfare increasing effect. If one compares the
equilibrium payoffs in Proposition 1 with the type 1 equilibrium payoffs in
Propositions 2-4 and Proposition 5, we can observe that for each ordering of
moves switching from the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game (i.e. when there
are only private firms on the market) to its mixed version strictly increases
social welfare.
Corollary 2 Assuming that a type 1 equilibrium is played in the case of
a strong private firm and capacities are in a range such that the standard
simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth game does not have an equilibrium
in pure strategies, then the appearance of a public firm makes the outcome
more competitive, i.e. the social welfare of the mixed version of the Bertrand-
Edgeworth game is higher than that of the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly
game.
Earlier research in this field has pointed out that in general the standard
simultaneous-move version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game does not have an
equilibrium in pure strategies (see, for example, Proposition 1).16 Considering
Propositions 2 and 5, we see that the simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth
mixed duopoly game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
16 In fact the class of demand curves that admit an equilibrium in pure strategies for
arbitrary capacity levels cannot intersect both axes (Tasna´di 1999).
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Corollary 3 In contrast to the standard simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth
game its mixed duopoly version always has an equilibrium in pure strategies
under Assumption 1-3.
6 A numerical example
We illustrate our main results summarized in the previous section by the
following example. Let the demand function be D(p) = 1−p. We assume that
k1 = 0.5, k2 = 0.4 and in the mixed version of the game firm 1 is the public
firm, while firm 2 is the private firm. We calculated the equilibrium prices and
payoffs both for the standard version of the game and for the mixed version
as well. According to our earlier arguments, we assumed in the example that
NE1 or SPNE1-type equilibria are played in each case. The following tables
show the values calculated for all the three possible orderings of moves.
Table 2 Calculated values for the simultaneous-moves case.
Standard version Mixed version
p∗1 0.2254 0.1563
p∗2 0.2068 0.1563
pi∗1 0.0900 0.4870
pi∗2 0.0720 0.0625
Social welfare 0.4715 0.4870
Note that in the first column of Table 2 the equilibrium prices, profits and
social welfare given for the standard version of the game are expected values
as there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in case of simultaneous moves. We
have computed these expected values by employing the explicit solution of the
Bertrand-Edgeworth game determined by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
Table 3 Calculated values when firm 1 moves first.
Standard version Mixed version
p∗1 0.3000 0.1563
p∗2 0.3000 0.1563
pi∗1 0.0900 0.4870
pi∗2 0.1200 0.0625
Social welfare 0.4550 0.4870
The values in Tables 2-4 show the social welfare-increasing effect of the
appearance of a public firm, which we emphasized in Section 5.
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Table 4 Calculated values when firm 2 moves first.
Standard version Mixed version
p∗1 0.3000 0.1563
p∗2 0.1800 0.1563
pi∗1 0.0900 0.4870
pi∗2 0.0720 0.0625
Social welfare 0.4550 0.4870
7 Concluding remarks
We analyzed the mixed Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game with the following
two participants: a private profit-maximizing firm and a public social welfare
maximizing firm. We found that the appearance of a public firm is advanta-
geous from various points of view. First, the timing of decisions does not play
a role since all games with an exogenously given order of moves result in the
same outcome. Second, the appearance of a public firm increases social wel-
fare. Third, the mixed version of the simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth
game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
In our analysis we focused on the interesting case in which the standard
Bertrand-Edgeworth game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. It
should be emphasized that in the other case (i.e. pc ≥ max{pm1 , pm2 }) there is
no real difference concerning the market outcome between the standard and
mixed versions of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game. In particular, sales take only
place at the market clearing price and the entire demand is served at that price
regardless of the ordering of moves. However, similarly to the strong private
firm case the simultaneous-move game and the private leadership game has an
additional implausible outcome of type 3, whenever k1 ≤ k2 and k1 ≤ D(pM ),
in which the private firm sets price p∗2 = max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
and the public
firm a higher price p∗1 > max
{
pM , P (k2)
}
. We consider this latter outcome
as implausible since this would require that the public firm does not want
to enter the market in order achieve at least a positive income or a higher
consumer surplus though social welfare remains the same. The equilibria can
be determined in an analogous way to the strong private firm case.17
We have not investigated the situation yet, where more than one private
firms exist on the market. However, we should be aware that our knowledge
concerning the Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly game with only private firms
is limited. Even the existence of an equilibrium of multi-period games with
exogenously given ordering of moves is not known for the case in which at
least pairs of firms move in different time periods. Most recent results on
the mixed-strategy equilibria of the simultaneous-move Bertrand-Edgeworth
oligopoly game by Hirata (2009) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010) point
to the difficulty of the problem.
17 A detailed proof is available upon request from the authors.
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In the current paper we have investigated the production-to-order ver-
sion of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game. In a future work we plan to consider
the production-in-advance case for which answering the same questions ad-
dressed in this paper is much harder. In particular, only the case of symmetric
capacities appears to be tractable when comparing the standard production-
in-advance price-setting game with its mixed version, since the firms’ mixed-
strategy equilibrium profits are only known for that case (see Tasna´di 2004).
Other questions that could be addressed in future research within the
capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth framework are partial privatization
(as initiated by Matsumura 1998), free entry (as investigated for the quantity-
setting case, for instance, by Ino and Matsumura 2010), the presence of foreign
private firms (see for example, Fjell and Pal 1996), the endogenous emergence
of capacity differentials between private and public firms (like by Corneo and
Rob 2003 in which the efficiency gap between private and public firms is de-
rived from workers’ incentives).
Acknowledgements We are very grateful to two anonymous referees for many helpful
comments and suggestions.
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